Financing local public goods is a major issue in rnany comnlunities, especially those that have experienced rapid growth. This paper analyzes proble~ns associated with locally collected real property taxes where the real property tax base is only revaluated at long time intervals. Using counties in North Carolina as the subject of the analysis, we find that effective real property tax rates fall between revaluations. We calculate that a system of taxing rntrrkrr values of real property at a constant legislated tax rate would have yielded additional annual revenues of $320 million for North Carolina counties over 1980 t o 1995.
Three core principles of public finance are efficiency, equity, and ease of administration (Eckstein, 1979 : Hylnan, 1996 Rosen, 1999) .
To these can be added a fourth criterion, poliltical feasibility. The four principles can be used as a scoring procedure to evaluate the pros and cons of alternative taxes.
An operating standard of taxation that cuts across 2111 four core principles is that tax revenues should s r o w with increases in the economic base to which the tax is applied. If the tax base automatically increases with increases in the economic base, then this standard ir met. However, if the tax base increase\ at a slower rate than the economic base, then the tax rate must be increased to keep tax revenues commensurate with the economic base. But since there may be public resistance to continual increases in tax rates, political feasibility may prevent tax rates from rising enough to maintain the relationship between tax revenues and the economic base. In this case, shortfalls in tax revenues can lead to shortfalls in public goods a s the economic base gl-ows.
A type of tax where this situation call arise is real property taxation, which is taxation of real estate. Property taxation is a major revenue source for local governments, accounting for 74 percent of locally collected tax revenues nationwide in 1996 (Tax Foundation, 2000) , and real property tax revenues are the biggest component of total property tax revenues. However, real property is often only revalued at long intervals. In 1999, only eight states annually I-evaluated real property, and on1 y one of these states (Florida) and Virginia. Several potential consequences of this process ciui serve as hypotheses. First, legislated tax rates are more likely increased as the time from the last revaluation increases. Second, there will he large increases in assessed property values at each revaluation, since each revaluation includes an accumulation of real property value changes over several years. The jump in assessed property values at each revaluation may prompt a reduction in the legislated tax rate in the revaluation year. Third, in a period of rising real property values, the eflkctivr tax rate may i'all as the time from the last revaluation increases. The effective tax rate is the legislated tax rate per market real property value. If the legislated rate doesn't rise at a pace commensurate with increases in real property values between revaluation years, then the effective tax rate will fall during that time period.
Jo~lrrlul of A g r i ( .~/ t~~r c i (
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the real property revaluation and tax process and its implications in one state. North Carolina. In 1999, property taxation accounted for 68 percent of locally collected tax revenues in North Carolina (North Carolina Office of State ' The most common ~~p d a t i n g methods were u\e of computer models to derive new values for properties and applyins a general percentage factor to change the value of properties.
' The reader should note the technical difference between valuation, assessment, and revaluation. A property is initially valued or appraised. When the property's value is put on the tax rolls, that value is then termed the trsse.ssed ~)rrlur. When the property is reappraised it is revalued. The new value-the revaluation-then becomes the assessed value on the tax rolls. In North Carolina the assessed value is 100 percent of the market v a i~~e at the last revaluation. Budget and Management, 2000) . North Carolina presents a good example of this process because the time period between revaluations in the state is eight years. Also, the state has no method for updating assessed property values between revaluation years. Even new real property in North Carolina is not valued at its current market value but is placed at a value estimated to have existed at the last revaluation. Obviou~ly, thi\ maintains the equitable position of new real property with existing real property.
The current eight-year revaluation cycle in North Carolina evolved over time. In the early 19th century, real property revaluations were conducted annually by townships. However, a state study in 196 1 found some counties had not conducted real property revaluations in 50 years. Consequently. legislation was enacted to require full revaluations, based on actual visitation and observation, at least once every eight years, with mid-point (four-year) revaluations based on economic trends. Yet, at the time, appraisal experts a r g~~e d that equitable revaluations could only be accomplished with actual visitation and inspection. Hence, the eight-year revaluation cycle became the norm in the state.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data and, importantly, the calculation of market real property values. The third section presents trends in legislated property tax rates, assessed real property values, and property tax collections. In the fourth section trends are compared for assessed and market real property values and for legislated and effective tax rates. Potential shortfalls in real property tax revenue collections as a result of using assessed property values rather than market property values as the tax base are estimated and analyzed in section five. In the concluding section the four core principles of public finance are used to conipare the current property taxation system with an alternative system that uses annual estimates of changes in market property values.
Data
The majority of data for the analysis was taken from the North Carolina "LINC" (log into --North -Carolina) data set. LINC includes the fvllowing variables for each of North Carolina's 100 counties relevant to the study: assessed value of real property. legislated tax rate applied to assessed real property value, current year, year in which property tax revaluations are taken, and real property tax collections. These data are available for a 16-year period from 1980 to 1995. Hence. an average of two revaluation cycles in each county are covered by the study p e r i~d .~ An important issue is the developtnent of market real property values. The North Carolina Association of County Commissioners reports annual surveys of the market values of real properties in each county.' These market values are then compared to the assased values of the same properties to form average assessment ratios ((assessed value/market value) * 100) for each county. The county average assessment ratios are available for each year from 1988 to I995 (North Carolina Association of Cour~ty Commissioners, 1989 Commissioners, -1996 . Market real property values for these years are formed by dividing the county assessed value in the year by the assessment ratio in that year.
Of interest are the determinants of the county average assessment ratios. The determinants are investigated with the following regression equation using the data for 1988 to 1995: The variable YRSINCE is measured in number of years, COUNTY represents 100 categorical variables for North Carolina counties, and all other variables are measured in percentage terms. POPGRO and INCGRO are calculated f r o n data in the LINC data set. SOUTHRT is calculated from data from the U.S. Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001) and is used as the housing value inflation rate in the absence of any consistently measured state or county level housing inflation rates. YRSINCESQ, POPGROSQ, AND INCGROSQ are quadratic terms used to test for non-linear relationships between them and ASSESSRT.
It is expected that the more years since the last revaluation, the lower will be the assessed value as a percentage of the market value, and so the parameter estimate on YRSINCE should be negative. Likewise, the greater the housing inflation rate (SOUTHRT), the lower should be ASSESSRT. POP and INC are included to control for growth impacts on AS-SESSRT. We would expect that faster growth in either population or personal income should result in faster growth in real property values and a lower ASSESSRT. The 100 county cat- The results of estimating equation ( 1 ) are in Table 1 . The fixed effects of the 100 county categorical variables were statistically significant but are not shown." The parameter estimates for YRSINCE, POPGRO, and SOUTHRT have the expected negative signs. The parameter estimate 011 INCGRO is positive and statistically significant. contrary to expectations. Perhaps this means that, controlling for population growth. counties with greater growth i n personal income have Inore resources clevoted to revaluations and thus produce revaluations in which the assessed value is closer to the rnarket value. However, the quadratic term, INCGROSQ, is negative and statistically significant, indicating that AS-SESSRT increases with INCGRO but at 11 declining rate.
Trends in Legislated Tax Kates, Assessed Real Property Values, atid Property Tax Collections
This section presents the results for trends in legislated real property tax rates, assessed real property values, and the resulting property tax collections. Changes in the measures are compared to the number of years since the last I-eal property revaluation. Figure 1 shows the average trend in legislated real property tax rates during the years of the revaluation cycle. During years when LI revaluation of real property is made (years since last revaluation = O), there is a substantial reduction in the legislated tax rate. Presumably, county cornmiscioners enact this reduction in reaction to the large cumulative increase in real property valucs that occur in revaluation years. Subsequently, there is a gradual increase in the tax rate with each year past the revaluation year. At the end of' the eight-year cycle. the cumulative rate change has recovered all the decrease that occurred in " Fixed cl'fects for year (categorical variables for each year) were also tcstetl hut were not statistically significant in this or any o f the other equations reported in Table I . the revaluation year plus 2.1 cents per $100 real property value. Equation (2) in Table 1 shows that the percentage change in the legislated tax rate (RTCHG) is positively related '1 11a-to the number of years since the last rev, 1 tion and is lower in years when the inflation rate (SOUTHRT) is higher. The statistically significant negative coefficient on YRSIN-CESQ means the positive relationship between RTCIHG and YRSINCE is non-linear, increasing with YRSINCE at a declining rate.
Correspondingly, Figure 2 shows the trend in assessed real property values between years when revaluations are made. As hypothesized, in revaluation years (years since last revaluation = 0) there is a large increase in assessed real property values. In the North Carolina data, the average inf ation-adjusted increase is 72.2 p e r~e n t .~ I n years until the next revaluation, there is modest change in assessed real property values resulting from new construction. Figure 3 shows the resulting trends in changes in real property tax collections. There is a large increase in real property tax collections in the revaluation year. Rcal property values apparently increase Inore than the legislated tax rate is reduced. Thereafter, there are modest changes in real property tax collections.
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 1 show that the percentage change in both assessed real property values (ASSESSVL) and real property tax collections (TAXCOLL) are negatively related to years since the last revaluation, as revealed in Figures 2 and 3 . In both cases the relationship is non-linear, with the declines being smaller as the time since the last revaluation increases. Also, the percentage change in assessecl real property values is greater in years with a higher inflation rate (SOUTHRT).
' Avcragcs are calculated as means. There is no change in Ihe pattern of tinclings when the median is used as the average. Inflatiun-adjustcd real property values were derived using the chain-type GDP price index for personal consumption expenditures as the detlator. The nominal percentage changes were very similar in si7e. Years since last revaluation real property at a constant tax rate over the revaluation cycle? To answer this question, the following calculations were made. First, acrual real property tax collections were calculated for each county in each year of the I-evaluation cycle. Of course, this calculation uses legislated tax rates applied to assessed real property values. Second, estimated potentiul real property tax collections were calculated for each county in each year of the revaluation cycle in this way. For each revaluation cycle the tax rate was set at the rate in the year of the revaluation. Recall from Figure I that this is the lowest tax rate during the revaluation cycle. Then this tixed tux rate was applied to the market value of real pl-opel-ty during each year of the assessment cycle. Third, the estimated real property tax 1o.r.v was calculated as the difference between the estimated potential real property tax collections and the ucti~nl real property tax collections. The loss was expressed as a percentage of the actual tax collection. A positive value for the property tax loss percentage means estirnated potential collections exceed actual collections, and a negative value means estimated potential collections exceed actual collections. These calculations were done for 1988-1 995 when estimates of market real property values are available ti-om the county coinmissioner data.
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Calculation of Potential Shortfalls in Real Property Tax Collections
The divergence o f market values from assessed values over the revaluation cycle raises an important question. Are North Carolina counties losing real property tax revenues by not taxing real property at its market value each year? That is, which o f the following two methods would yield greater property tax revenues over the revaluation cycle: the current niethod o f taxing assessed values at a progressively higher rate over the revaluation cycle or a method o f taxing the market value o f
The results are displayed graphically in Figure 6 . The tigure indicates that estimated potential real property tax collections exceed actual real property tax collections, and the size of the difference increases with the time from the last revaluation. The potential loss percentage rises from approximately 5 percent in the first year after the revaluation to 12 percent in the seventh year since the revaluation. The monetary size of these potential tax losses is not trivial. The average annual total nominal dollar amount for all counties in North Carolina is $324 million.
Besides the number of years since the last revaluation we would expect the size of the potential loss to he positively related to econornic growth. This is because market values of real property should increase more in counties that are growing faster, and this will increase the gap between market and assessed values. To test this hypothesis we regress the estimated percentage loss (LOSS) on the years since the last assessment (YRSlNCE). the percentage change in population from the previous year (POPGRO), and the percentage change in personal income (INCGRO) from the previous year. Also included as regressors are the quadratric terms YRSINCESQ', POP-GROSQ'. and INCGROSQ', SOUTHRT and the county categorical terms (results not shown). This I-egr-ession is estimated for 1988 to 1995.
The results are given in equation ( 5 ) of Table I . For every year since the last assessment, LOSS is 1.6 percentage points higher. LOSS also increases with lNCGRO but at a declining rate.
Finally legislated real property tax rates were in-rived from growth are not adequate to fund creased more than enough over the revaluation the local public goods required by the growth cycle to counteract the gap between market (Burchell and Listokin. 1978) . values and assessed values.
The current system is also not equituhle over time because property owner\ in different Evaluation and Conclusions years pay different effective tax rates, dependThis study has identified a potential problenl in the collection of real property taxes. The problem is that in states where real property is revalued only at long time intervals the tax base of assessed real property does not necessarily grow with the economic base. In North Carolina, a state where infrequent real property revaluations occur. we found that county commissioners usually increase the legislated tax rate during the period between revaluations. However, for most counties in North Carolina the increase was found to not be sufficient to produce revenue equal to that derived from taxing the market value of real property at a constant tax rate. Indeed, the data for North Carolina counties for 1988 to 1995 indicate that significant gains in real property tax revenues could occur from taxing the market value of real property at a constant tax rate over the revaluation cycle. Over half of North Carolina's 100 counties could have realized average annual real property tax revenue gains of more than 10 percent from S L I C~ a systenl. The gains are greater in counties with a higher rate of growth in person a 1 tncome. ' However, to anticipate problems and issues related to a move away from the current property tax system, evaluation of the current system against a new system of applying a constant property tax rate to annually updated real property market values can be accomplished by using the four principles of public finance.
It can be a r g~~e d the current system is inef3cient in two W;IYS. First, the decline in the c<flec,tive property tax rate with years since the last revaluation may encourage delayed investments in real property. Second, our finding that the current system yields less tax revenue than a system of applying a constant tux rate to annually updated market values can obviously lead to ~~nderinvestrnent in public goods. Tt can also explain the often-heard claim that local economic growth doesn't "pay for itself", in the sense that local tax revenues deing on how long ago the last revaluation occurred. Rut a new system of annual estimates of real property values can also introduce inequities. Any system of estimating real values based o n sampling, predictive computer models, or simply applying the same rate of increase to all properties u.ill introduce some degree of error. Some owners will have their properties overvalued and others will have undervalued propel-ties.
The c~~r r e n t system gets high marks on ruse of crtlr?~ini.~ttzltion. Each year local political leaders set the tax rate. and administrators then apply the rate to assessed values. Only when on-site revaluations are done every eight years (in North Carolina) is substantial administrative effort needed to implement the revaluation and evaluate and rule o n appeals from property owners.
In contrast, a new system of annually adjusting assessed values to approximate market values would require additional administative costs. Property tax administrators woi~ld first need to decide on the method for annually adjusting assessed values. In states where this is done, three alternative nlethods are used: adjusting all property values by the same external factor (such as the change in the Consunler Price Index), adjusting all property values in the same class (single family, multi-family) by an external factor specific to the class, or using a sample of annually surveyed market values together with a con~puter program to individually adjust properties.
In addition, administrators would need to establish a procedure for dealing with past over-adjustments or under-adjustments when full on-site revaluations are done. On this point several "sticky" questions would have to be resolved, such as what recourse does a property owner have whose on-site I-evaluation reveals his or her past c..stirnateri values have been too high and he or she has consequent1 y over paid past property taxes'?
The politiccrl ,feasibility of the current system is based on the ability of political leaders to annually increase property tax rates. The political difficulty in accomplishing this probably accounts for the shortful in tax revenues compared to the alternative system of applying a constant rate to annually estimated market values. However, for citizens to accept the alternative system they will have to believe the process of annually updating property values without universal on-site evaluation is accurate and fair.
In conclusion, our analysis has revealed that a property tax system with long periods between revaluations cannot guarantee that tax revenues increase at the same rate as the economic base. Although an alternative system of annually updating the real property tax base without full on-site inspections would appear to be more efficient, it is not necessarily SLIperior on the basis of equity, ease of administration, and political feasibility. Local political leaders therefore have two imperfect systems to choose from. Whichever system is used, it would behoove political leaders to explain t o citizens the system's relative advantages and disadvantages.
